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ABSTRACT 
There is arguably a consensus that the current approach to drought relief is in need of 
reform and possibly replacement with an improved government financial assistance 
mechanism. Grants to farmers, in the form of interest rate subsidies, have several 
difficulties, which in summary are as follows: 
i.  There are typically too few financial resources to be drawn from government to 
address adequately and equitably the needs of farms in a dire drought situation.  
ii.  The rationing arising from (i) means that access to assistance requires complex 
eligibility criteria, resulting in application and administrative processes that are 
complex and thus expensive for both farmers and government. 
iii.  Grants for drought relief are financed by contributions from all taxpayers, and it is 
very likely to be the case that this is regressive. Average taxpayers will be less 
wealthy and have fewer other economic advantages than the majority of farmers 
assisted through drought relief.  
 
This paper outlines the potential advantages and challenges associated with the 
implementation of income related loan arrangements for drought relief as a possible 
alternative to the existing interest rate subsidy scheme. The conceptual basis of income 
related loans is explained, and reference is made to the application of policies of this type 
in other areas of government financial intervention. The paper addresses the 
administrative challenges associated with such a policy reform, with reference to the 
idiosyncrasies of agricultural financing. An illustrative example is offered of what an 
income related loan applied to drought assistance might mean for the time stream of both 
revenue for the Commonwealth budget and repayment obligations for farms differing by 
economic size. 
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1. Introduction 
In October 2003, the Primary Industries Ministerial Council agreed that the 
Australian Government Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, the Hon Warren 
Truss MP would 'convene a national Roundtable in 2004 to discuss how future drought 
assistance can be made more efficient and effective' (Truss 2003b). In preparation for the 
Roundtable a Drought Review Panel has been set up to consult with stakeholders about 
drought assistance and prepare a paper for the Roundtable. In November 2003, Minister 
Truss announced the composition of the Review Panel and the Terms of Reference for its 
review. 
The Terms of Reference included that the Panel seek the views of stakeholders on 
key elements of future drought policy including 'income contingent loans for drought 
relief' (Truss 2003a). This submission addresses this element of the Terms of Reference. 
Income related loans for drought relief are consistent with the National Drought Policy’s 
principles of risk management and self-reliance. In effect, the loans are a mirror image of 
the highly successful Farm Management Deposits Scheme, allowing farmers to borrow 
from future good years to cover present difficulties associated with exceptional drought.  
This submission is based on the premise that support will be offered only to 
farmers in areas declared to be experiencing exceptional circumstances (EC) drought. 
The shortcomings of the existing system of exceptional circumstances declarations have 
been examined extensively (see for example Botterill and Chapman 2002; Botterill 
2003a, pp203-206) and are beyond the scope of this paper. In summary they relate to the 
problems associated with arriving at an ‘objective’ definition of exceptional drought, the 
declaration and revocation criteria and the delineation of the areas determined to be 
experiencing exceptional drought
1. For the purposes of the following discussion, the 
definitions and declarations of EC are to be retained in their current or a revised form. 
There is scope for refinement of the process of EC declaration and this has the potential 
to improve the operation of any drought relief scheme including an income related loan.  
The submission focuses on the provision of support to farm businesses during 
exceptional drought events. It is not proposing the replacement of the welfare component 
of the existing drought policy, the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment, with an 
income related loan. As has been argued elsewhere, farm welfare support is a complex 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the scientific and political aspects of exceptional circumstances drought declarations 
see White et al (forthcoming).   2
policy problem which requires further examination (Botterill 2003b). It is beyond the 
scope of this submission. 
The submission also does not address the relationship between the Farm 
Management Deposits scheme and the application of an income related loan. How 
governments may wish to structure incentives for drought preparation and the interaction 
between these incentives and drought relief is a matter for policy decision. 
There is arguably a consensus that the current approach to drought relief is in 
need of reform and possibly replacement with an improved government financial 
assistance mechanism. Grants to farmers, in the form of interest rate subsidies, have 
several difficulties, which in summary are as follows: 
(i)  There are typically too few financial resources to be drawn from government 
to address adequately and equitably the needs of farms in a dire drought 
situation.  
(ii)  The rationing arising from (i) means that access to assistance requires 
complex eligibility criteria, resulting in application and administrative 
processes that are complex and thus expensive for both farmers and 
government. 
(iii)  Grants for drought relief are financed by contributions from all taxpayers, and 
it is very likely to be the case that this is regressive. Average taxpayers will be 
less wealthy and have fewer other economic advantages than the majority of 
farmers assisted through drought relief.  
 
This submission outlines the potential advantages and challenges associated with 
the implementation of income related loan arrangements for drought relief as a possible 
alternative to the existing interest rate subsidy scheme. The conceptual basis of income 
related loans is explained, and reference is made to the application of policies of this type 
in other areas of government financial intervention. The paper addresses the 
administrative challenges associated with such a policy reform, with reference to the 
idiosyncrasies of agricultural financing. An illustrative example is offered of what an 
income related loan applied to drought assistance might mean for the time stream of both 
revenue for the Commonwealth budget and repayment obligations for farms differing by 
economic size. 
   3
 
2.  Income Related Loans in Theory and in Practice 
An income related loan is a government financing instrument in which those 
assisted are required to repay the debt if and only when future economic circumstances 
are favourable. Unlike other debt, the arrangement explicitly takes into account a 
borrower’s capacity to pay. An income related loan as applied to drought relief would 
mean that a farm business receiving public funds would treat a proportion (perhaps all) of 
the financial assistance as an obligation to be repaid, contingent on the farm's future 
ability to repay. The conceptual basis, and some experience, of income related loans are 
now explained. 
A notable national application of an income related loan is the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme adopted in 1989, in which Australian university students are 
required to pay tuition charges depending on their future incomes
2. Income related loans 
for higher education student tuition and/or income support have since been adopted in 
New Zealand (1991), South Africa (1991) Chile (1994), and the UK (planned for 
implementation in 2005). 
HECS was motivated by public sector concern with the risks associated with 
human capital investments, which imply strongly that some form of government 
intervention will improve financing arrangements. For a variety of reasons explained in 
Barr (2001), income related loans are preferable to other approaches to financing human 
capital investments. This means that if future economic circumstances turn out to be poor 
in a particular period, a well-designed income related loan would require only minimal 
repayments. Accordingly, income related loans offer insurance against the possibility of a 
debt contributing to future hardship and, in the extreme, an income related loan provides 
protection against default. Other types of loans do not offer this type of security.  
There has by now been a considerable amount of research on HECS. With respect 
to the financing of drought relief two facts are relevant. The first is that the scheme has 
had no adverse consequences for the access to university of relatively poor prospective 
students, whose numbers increased by about 40 per cent in the 1988-99 period. A 
convincing interpretation of this is that, not only did HECS in reality offer default-
protection for students, it was also apparently seen to do so. The bottom line for an 
                                                 
2 While in practical terms the scheme was an Australian innovation, the notion has been in the economics 
literature since at least Friedman promoted it in 1955.   4
income related loan drought relief arrangement is that this form of financing has been 
acceptable with borrowers in other areas. 
The other fact is that the collection of HECS revenue, through the Australian Tax 
Office, has turned out to be very efficient. Administrative costs account for less than 
3 per cent of the $900 million revenue now raised annually (Chapman and Ryan 2002). 
Thus while before its introduction in 1988 Australian tax authorities and many others 
warned against the alleged major administrative complexities, this has turned out not to 
be the case 
3. 
Several other applications of the basic principle of income related loans have been 
developed over recent years, and some of these are noted in Chapman (2002). For 
example, income related loans can be an effective financial instrument for, among other 
applications, student income support, the part financing of community-based small 
business investments, government assistance with R&D expenditures, and with respect to 
the repayment of sports scholarships for elite athletes. What most of these income related 
loan applications have in common is that they are designed to move taxpayer assistance 
for particular groups away from grants, which are typically regressive, and towards loans. 
However, a critical point for policy is that while a major proportion of an income related 
loan is to be repaid, the nature of the repayment offers considerable protection for 
borrowers.  
For an income related loan involving the transfer of funds it is obvious that some 
financing mechanism needs to be available to provide the financial resources. There are 
two options. 
The first would be for the public sector to provide the initial resources, from tax 
revenue (or from the sale of bonds), as is the case for other government outlays. It is of 
interest to note that there would apparently be no implications for the budget in an 
accounting sense, since as with HECS, the outlays would very likely be treated as an 
equivalent asset.  
A second possibility would be to have the loans provided by a commercial bank 
or banks, with the repayments collected through the tax system. This would require the 
Commonwealth government to contract to repay the lending institution(s) at commercial 
rates, knowing that the public sector would eventually recover the loans. The advantage 
of this approach is that there would not be any need for large government outlays since 
                                                 
3 For a description of this debate, see Edwards (2001).   5
the public sector obligation would be spread over time. This arrangement has a precedent 
and is how the AUSTUDY Loan Supplement, instituted in 1994, was financed. 
 
3.  Applying Income Related Loans to Drought Relief 
3.1 Advantages 
The application of an income related loan for drought relief fits into the above 
contexts.  It has the following advantages. 
The first relates to equity. Because some part of taxpayers’ drought subsidies are 
recovered when the farm business is succeeding commercially, there is an important 
equity dimension since taxpayers would be providing a lower subsidy per farm assisted. 
Second, the fact that there are returns of some drought related outlays has the 
benefit of making additional resources available for public sector uses. These might 
include: increasing the coverage and/or level of drought assistance; higher outlays in 
other areas of government, such as health and education; reducing the size of the net 
budget deficit; and/or reducing the overall tax take.  
A third advantage is contextual. The movement of drought assistance away from 
grants and toward income related loans would be consistent with the basis of 'mutual 
obligation' reforms in other areas of policy, such as labour market assistance. It would 
reflect an undertaking that the society assists those in economic trouble at the time of 
their need, but on the basis of an obligation of those helped to relieve taxpayer burdens 
when and only if they are able. 
3.2 Challenges 
3.2.1  Adverse Selection and a 'top up' income related loan 
A concern typically raised with respect to policy is what economists label 'adverse 
selection'. This is the phenomenon whereby there is a form of self-selection into active 
participation in a program with the unfortunate consequence of providing most help to 
groups least deserving of assistance. An example from the insurance field would be the 
provision of universal vehicle accident insurance coverage to all drivers, meaning that 
excessively risky drivers would be subsidised by more careful individuals. In this 
example the industry attempts to diminish the consequences of adverse selection by 
having high excess payments for young drivers. 
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Adverse selection in the context of the application of an income related loan to 
drought relief might take the following form. Some farms, perhaps farms which have 
been managed poorly, or farms which in the long run might not be economically viable 
for reasons of location, would be those most heavily subsidised by, and thus most 
interested in taking advantage of, an income related loan. This is because farm businesses 
likely to experience future poor financial circumstances would benefit the most from an 
income related loan, and in an extreme case might even be able to avoid any level of 
significant repayment of the debt. It would be in the interests of these poorly performing 
farms to take as much as possible of an income related loan.  Adverse selection of this 
type has the potential to undermine significantly the financial basis of an income related 
loan scheme. 
However, it is not just the nature of the take-up of an income related loan and 
what it means for repayments that is at issue. It is also the prospect that an income related 
loan has the potential to subsidise farm businesses with poor long term prospects. This 
possibility implies that an income related loan could act to inhibit desirable structural 
change in agriculture, and with arguably considerable and on-going costs to taxpayers. 
The issue warrants serious consideration, and a possible solution is now offered. 
The implications of adverse selection could be addressed by making access to 
income related loan support contingent on a vetting process motivated by concerns for 
future economic viability. This vetting process is promoted to help ensure that only farms 
with expected strong commercial futures would qualify for assistance. This is consistent 
with the eligibility criteria for the existing interest rate subsidy scheme which is targeted 
at farmers who have 'prospects of long-term profitability and sustainability' (AFFA 2003, 
p12), but are adversely affected by exceptional circumstances such as severe drought. 
The simplest approach would involve an income related loan being treated as a 
top up to additional bank credit, and might work as follows. Given the establishment of 
an income related loan scheme, a farm business approaches its commercial bank for a 
loan, or extension of existing credit, in times of financial need associated with 
exceptional drought. The scheme is made operative with the understanding that the 
government will provide income related loan financial resources in proportion to the 
commercial credit gained. For example, a ratio of 2:1 might be the rule, meaning that if 
the bank provides $20,000 for example, the level of income related loan assistance would 
be $40,000. The farm then has access to an additional $60,000 in total, one-third in the 
usual form of commercial credit and two-thirds to be repaid as an income related loan.   7
A significant advantage of a top up approach is that it would limit the extent to 
which adverse selection could operate. In the above example, the bank would still be 
concerned with the risk of non-payment of the $20,000, meaning that long term economic 
viability matters, meaning that businesses with expected poor prospects would not be 
able to qualify for any public sector help. However, because the income related loan 
could be used initially to pay interest on the commercial loan, those farms qualifying 
would be more likely to repay the bank loan without duress and arguably be in more 
financially propitious circumstances in the longer term. Income related loans for drought 
relief can be designed to limit default risk not just for borrowers, as in HECS, but for 
commercial lenders as well. 
A government could decide that adverse selection is not a major issue in the 
design of an income related loan for drought relief. In this situation there would be no top 
up and thus a more widespread availability of the facility. However, there are sound 
reasons to canvass the need for some form of vetting, and the top up suggestion seems to 
achieve this through some level of commercial bank involvement. 
3.2.2 Collection  Issues 
Gross revenue as the basis of collection 
As a business, the farm has a number of legitimate expenses which are deducted 
from the income on which tax is payable, which can result in low or negative income for 
taxation purposes, perhaps even in economic circumstances which are not poor. In order 
to ensure that farms repay an income related loan when they are in a position to do so it is 
suggested that the unit of collection be one to which such deductions do not apply. It is 
proposed therefore that the collection of a drought income related loan be on the basis of 
a small percentage of the farm’s gross income. This figure is already declared on the 
farm’s Business Activity Statement (BAS) at Item G1 (total sales). As a gross figure, it 
cannot be minimised to reduce the amount payable through deductions such as 
depreciation or Farm Management Deposits. 
Multiple ABNs 
It is possible, and common practice, for farm businesses to hold multiple 
Australian Business Numbers (ABNs) raising the possibility that a drought income 
related loan might be attached to a different ABN from that against which gross income 
is reported.    8
However, under the current GST regime, farm businesses with multiple ABNs 
have the option of ‘grouping’, which allows them to report their GST for all entities as 
one, that is, on a single BAS. The advantages of grouping are that only one BAS needs to 
be submitted and transfers within the farm structures, for example, between a family trust 
and a partnership, do not incur GST. Rural accountants recommend that farm businesses 
take advantage of this option to group. In order to address the possibility that multiple 
ABNs could be used to avoid repaying an income related loan, farm businesses with a 
drought income related loan could be required to group for their BAS and GST returns.  
Sale of the farm business 
As the drought income related loan is attached to the farm business there would 
be a requirement that in the event of a sale the loan would have to be repaid in full. Note 
that the ABN is unique to the registered entity, not the business. As with all sales of 
businesses, there are certain searches carried out by legal practitioners acting for both the 
buyer and the seller. An ABN search could become one of these for rural property 
owners. Alternatively, an additional box could be added to the GST return, which could 
be required to be ticked/left blank depending on the sale of a property or business. An 
incorrect answer would constitute a fraud and legal remedies would exist for collection. 
Change in ownership arrangements 
This case relates to a change in the ownership of the registered entity, for example 
a new shareholder comes into the company, a new partner is admitted to a partnership, or 
a partner in a partnership retires. The change to the shareholding of a company, which 
has an existing loan under this scheme, will have no impact. The company will still retain 
the same ABN. 
The re-constitution of a partnership is different, since a change in a partnership 
means a new ABN. Applications to change must address the question 'did the partnership 
arise as a result of a re-constitution, that is, a change of partners?'. If the answer is 'yes', 
the ABN of the former partnership is required. This would be enough to alert the ATO to 
the existence of a loan. For example, if a father retires from a partnership, but the sons 
continue, the loan might not need to be cleared as a lump sum as in the case of the sale of 
the entity but could be transferred instead to the new ABN. 
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Death of the farmer 
In this case, executors of the farm business can either take over the business or 
sell it. If the business continues to run essentially as before, an option would be for the 
loan to remain attached to the business along with any commercial financial loans. If the 
executors were to sell the business, the income related loan obligation would be repaid 
similarly to any other continuing commercial loan obligations.  
Lumpiness of income 
The variability of farm income raises the issue of ‘lumpiness’ of revenue flow and 
the potential impact of repaying the income related loan. For example, PAYE employees 
who receive uneven income can overpay income tax on an annual basis by paying high 
rates in high income periods. This occurs because of the progressive nature of the income 
tax system and the existence of a tax-free threshold. However, if an income related loan 
is repaid at a flat rate with no threshold, such as the example outlined below, payments in 
high income periods will not result in annual overpayment. 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcies are rare occurrences in the rural sector as the regular monitoring of 
clients' balance sheets by banks means that the primary lender tends to encourage farms 
in difficulty to sell their assets before bankruptcy occurs. If a farm has an income related 
loan in addition to other commercial loans, the bank will take this into account when 
assessing the farm's financial position. In the unlikely event that bankruptcy does occur, it 
is suggested that commercial debts could be paid before the Commonwealth claims any 
outstanding income related loans from the farm business. 
 
4.  Revenue and Repayments: An Illustrative Example  
4.1 Background 
The following shows the possible revenue and repayment time streams for a 
hypothetical income related loan with parameters described below. The illustrations are 
taken from several examples presented in Kelly, Chapman and Botterill (2004), work 
prepared for and supported by the Rural Industries Research Development Corporation. 
RIRDC shares no responsibility for the analysis or conclusions. 
The Kelly et al exercise used gross farm revenue data as the basis for repayment 
obligations, for reasons explained in Section 3.2.2. These data were made available on an   10
annual basis by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics for the 
period 1989-2002, however, methods were devised to allow simulations for a much 
longer period (see Kelly et al 2004). The hypothetical income related loan is one in which 
loans of $50,000 are provided to farms situated in different quintiles of the annual 
revenue distribution, and for farms experiencing changes in their relative revenue 
situation over time.  
It is assumed that the government requires repayment of the debt at a rate of either 
2 or 5 per cent of annual gross revenue, with the 2 and 5 per cent figures chosen for 
reasons explained in Kelly et al. It is assumed that the amount lent is repaid in real terms, 
ie adjusted for inflation only. Thus there is an interest rate subsidy associated with this 
example of the income related loan. Kelly et al also illustrates the revenue and repayment 
consequences of income related loans with both higher and zero subsidies, as well as 
larger loan levels. 
There are two issues of financial concern with respect to the payment of an 
income related loan. The first relates to the implications of the policy for the 
Commonwealth budget. This is particularly important with respect to an income related 
loan with an on-going real interest rate subsidy, the example chosen, since with this 
variant of the scheme the public sector is implicitly subsidising debtors by around 4 per 
cent per annum
4 for every year in which the outlay remains unpaid. The time streams of 
repayment are illustrated in the next section. 
A second concern relates to the time stream of repayment of an income related 
loan for particular farm businesses differing with respect to gross revenue. This is 
addressed in Section 4.3. 
 
4.2  The Effect of an Income Related Loan on the Time Stream of Government 
Revenues 
Figure 1 illustrates the repayments to government of an income related loan of 
$50,000 to all farms, assumed to be allocated in Year 0. It is assumed that the loan 
amount is the same irrespective of the revenue of the farm, an issue considered further 
later. To demonstrate the differential impact on government receipts, the Figure shows 
                                                 
4 This estimate is based on the assumption that 4 per cent per annum is approximately the level of the real 
long-term bond rate.   11
the amount that will have been repaid at annual rates of both 2 per cent and 5 per cent of 
farm revenue.   
Figure 1 







































Note:  The percentage figures shown are the proportions of the total amount lent that 
has been repaid after 10 years 
Data source:   NATSEM 
 
The data suggest that 10 years after repayments commence the government can 
expect to have received a majority (nearly 60 per cent) of the amount lent at the low 
repayment rate of 2 per cent per year of gross revenue. At a relatively high repayment 
rate of 5 per cent per year of farm revenue, the government will have received around 80 
per cent of the original amount lent. These figures imply that for arguably reasonable 
repayment rates the extent of on-going unpaid debt is not excessive. 
The data of Figure 1 possibly exaggerate the time involved for income related 
loan repayment because the simulations on which they are based assume that farms 
receive the same loan level irrespective of their expected future revenues. However, this 
is very unlikely to be the case, particularly if the top up arrangement is in place. In this 
situation farms with high revenues would be more likely to have relatively large loans, 
the opposite being the case for farms with relatively low revenues. If this is the case the 
total debt will be repaid more quickly, and unreported simulations suggest that the 
difference is significant. The Figures shown are therefore likely to be an upper boundary 
for the time taken and thus could be seen as an overstatement of the true costs to the 
budget.   12
4.3  Distributions of Loan Repayments by Farm Revenues 
Income related loans are by definition tied to capacity to pay, meaning that farms 
with different levels of gross revenue will necessarily take varying periods of time to 
repay the loan. This issue is important for policy debate since it addresses the varying 
impact of an income related loan on farms with different revenue profiles. This section 
illustrates the length of time taken for the five revenue categories of farms to repay loans. 
Figure 2 illustrates outcomes for a rate of 2 per cent per year of farm revenue, and 
Figure 3 shows results for a repayment rate of 5 per cent. In both cases the repayment 
time is shown for the lowest (Q1), the median (Q3), and the top quintiles (Q3), as well as 
hypothetical farms which move through the revenue distribution, known as 'up-down' and 
'down-up' (see Kelly et al 2004). 
 
Figure 2 
Amount of loan unpaid over time by farm revenue,  























Q1 Median Q5 Up-Down Down-Up
 
Data source: NATSEM 
 
The data from Figure 2 illustrate the time stream of repayment with a repayment 
rate of 2 per cent only of annual gross revenue. The data suggest that the highest revenue 
farms (Q5) repay the loan in under six years, and the lowest revenue farms will have 
repaid about 40 per cent of the loan after 25 years.  The median farm repays the loan in 
full in 17 years. Farms moving through the revenue distribution will take around 11 to 15 
years to repay in full.   13
 
Figure 3 
Amount of loan unpaid over time by farm revenue, 























Q1 Median Q5 Up-Down Down-Up
 
Data source:   NATSEM 
 
Figure 3 suggests that the higher repayment rate of 5 per cent per annum results in 
the highest revenue farms (Q5) repaying the loan in just over two years and the farms 
with the lowest revenue repaying the loan in full in 25 years.  The median farm repays the 
loan in seven years, and farms moving through the revenue distribution take three to eight 
years to repay in full. 
A very large number of different simulations were undertaken and are reported in 
Kelly  et al,  including a comparison with the burden for farms of repaying a typical 
commercial loan compared with an income related loan. It is of interest to note that this 
part of the exercise highlights the advantage of an income related loan relative to a 
normal bank loan in terms of repayment obligations as a proportion of a farm’s gross 
annual revenue. The income related loan smooths the burden of repayments, and 
considerably so for farms experiencing significant fluctuations in revenue (see Kelly et al 
2004). 
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5. Conclusion 
An income related loan for drought relief has the potential to improve the delivery 
of drought relief to Australian farmers. The recovery of funds from farmers once their 
economic position improves could reduce the cost of drought relief to taxpayers, as well 
as minimise the regressivity of a grants-based scheme, or could make support available to 
more farms and/or at higher levels. In order to ensure that the scheme does not hinder the 
structural adjustment process, access to the drought income related loans could be limited 
through the imposition of both an annual cap and/or a cap on the total amount an 
individual farm could hold in income related loans at any one time. As well, to ensure 
that farms with poor prospects are not heavily subsidised, an income relate loan as a top 
up to additional commercial credit would seem to be desirable. 
Compared with the existing interest rate subsidies available to drought-affected 
farmers, an income related loan offers some advantages. The current grants scheme is 
administratively complex for farmers, banks and governments. As has been argued 
above, it is likely to be regressive.  Further, the rationing required due to budget 
limitations means that not all farmers who need assistance receive it. 
The government may decide that farmers should receive some form of taxpayer 
subsidy. This could be either in the form of an interest-free loan or a requirement that 
farmers repay only a portion of the amount borrowed. Such a scheme would be less 
regressive than the current scheme, however, depending on the level of the subsidy 
applied, it would have implications for the commercial financial sector and for the 
structural adjustment process. 
Overall, it is suggested that an income related loan may be a more equitable, 
efficient and effective means for delivering drought relief to farm businesses. The 
modelling discussed above and in more detail in the attachment suggests that the 
government could reasonably expect to recoup sufficient funds from the scheme to make 
it workable without imposing an unreasonable burden on farm businesses.  
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